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IS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE R&D ALWAYS
JUSTIFIED?
A DISCUSSION BASED ON THE LITERATURE ON GROWTH
Benjamin Montmartin∗ and Nadine Massard†
Abstract
Many economists have long held that market failures create a gap between social and pri-
vate returns to Research and Development (R&D), thereby limiting private incentives to invest
in R&D. However, this common belief that firms significantly underinvest in R&D is increasingly
being challenged, leading the rationale behind public support for private R&D to be questioned.
In this paper, we attempt to clarify the perspectives of two sources: the theoretical literature on
endogenous growth, and its recent developments in integrating a geographical dimension, and the
empirical literature that measures the social returns to R&D in relation to the private returns. Ulti-
mately, we are able to clearly distinguish among different types of market failures and compare their
relative impact on the gap between the private and social returns to R&D. Two main conclusions
are reached. First, systematic firm underinvestment in R&D is not demonstrated. Second, even
though instances of underinvestment do occur, they are mainly explained by surplus appropriability
problems rather than by knowledge externalities. This suggests the need for a new policy mix
that employs more demand-oriented instruments and is more concentrated on identifying efficient
allocations among activities rather than merely increasing global private R&D investment.
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Introduction
In most countries, investment in R&D is considered to be crucial for innovation and thus
for future growth and competitiveness. Consequently, many countries have set ambitious
targets for investment in R&D. For example, among the five targets defined by the Europe
2020 strategy for growth1 is a goal of investment in R&D of 3% of EU GDP (2/3 of which
should be realized by private funding). All OECD countries have also set such targets.
Moreover, these global strategies are generally informed by the idea that private incen-
tives to invest in R&D are insufficient because of the specific attributes of such activities.
Indeed, although R&D investment usually requires a large amount of financing and is highly
risky, it is also irreversible and rarely profitable in the short run. The public-good attributes
of the knowledge produced by R&D also imply that potential external effects are not in-
corporated into the economic calculations of firms when they make investment decisions.
In the economics literature, the implications of these attributes on private incentives to
invest in R&D have been widely studied. Such attributes generate sources of market failures
that create a theoretical gap between private and social returns to R&D. Although some
characteristics of R&D investment would lead firms to overinvest in R&D compared to the
socially optimal level of investment, there is broad consensus that the negative effects of
market failures on private investment in R&D are generally dominant.
It is worth noting that, based on this consensus, belief in the global underinvestment of
firms in R&D has rapidly become widespread among public authorities, so much so that it
is currently often taken for granted and considered to justify the implementation of many
public policies aimed at supporting R&D activities within firms. Such policies seek to not
only establish a favorable institutional context for R&D investment (notably based on the
patenting system), but increasingly to direct financial subsidies or indirect tax credits to
firms to support R&D.
All countries within the OECD, for example, provide direct financial support for R&D
and the number of OECD countries providing indirect financial support has grown from 12
in 1996 to 21 in 2008 (Mohnen and Lokshin, 2009). Among those countries implementing
a combination of direct and indirect support, a tendency seems to be emerging whereby
direct support is being progressively replaced by indirect support. Nevertheless, the volume
of funding devoted to direct support has greatly increased since the 1980s (Montmartin,
2013), and this is even more true in the case of indirect support.
However, this commonly held belief in the widespread under-investment of firms in R&D
relative to the socially optimal level is increasingly being questioned. Such questioning is
motivated by various factors. From a political perspective, increasing tensions within the
public sector generated by the financial crisis have reinforced the need to strongly justify and
rigorously evaluate public expenditures. Additionally, a review of the economics literature
in the field reveals significant weaknesses in both the theoretical and empirical bases for
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the belief in widespread underinvestment in R&D. On the theoretical front, new analyses
questioning the importance, and even the existence, of firm underinvestment in R&D have
recently been published. On the empirical front, the weaknesses of existing empirical
measures of the social return to R&D have cast doubt on the consensus that social returns
to R&D exceed private returns.
Moreover, given available data on the volume of private investment in R&D, the ca-
pacity of already implemented public policies to actually produce the expected incentive
effects may be reasonably questioned. Indeed, R&D financed by the private sector within
the European Union has increased only minimally over the last decade, rising from 1.03%
of GDP in 1999 to 1.09% in 2009, while in many countries, the cost of national public
support for R&D activities has increased significantly, along with the financial endowments
of European programs (essentially through R&D Framework Programs, but also more re-
cently through regional policies). Similarly, it may be noted that the European countries in
which private investment in R&D is close to or above the objective of 2% of GDP are also
the countries in which public financial support for private R&D is rather low (lower than
the European and OECD averages).
Given increasing tension around public expenditures, the availability of relevant method-
ologies to evaluate the impact of the public policies implemented to support private R&D
investment is becoming increasingly important for policy makers as they decide upon and
design suitable policy instruments. In observing current practices and public policy choices
made over the last several years and analyzing the conclusions of primary evaluations of
these policies, we are left, however, with a rather fuzzy picture that makes it difficult to
generate sound expectations regarding what the implemented policies will achieve.
In our view, two main factors contribute to the ambiguities in the implications of the
evaluations that have been conducted to date:
• First, the fact that all the policies are based on the taken-for-granted assumption of
private firm underinvestment in R&D.
• Second, the fact that although public policies aimed at encouraging firms to invest
more in R&D are diverse, they are generally designed and evaluated separately.
Within this context, a better understanding of the effects of various types of market
failures on the incentives of private agents to invest in R&D becomes important. It will help
to precisely characterize situations in which differences between social and private returns to
R&D arise and design public policy instruments that are capable of correcting the relevant
market failures. Moreover, a thorough analysis of the impact of market failures on R&D and
the sources of these market failures would provide a much sounder basis for the evaluation
of public policies designed to encourage R&D while providing better estimates of the extent
of private sector underinvestment in R&D and the potential effects of various policy mixes
(using various instruments to correct various market failures) on R&D investment.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the notion of firm underinvestment in
R&D using the theoretical framework provided by the endogenous growth literature and
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its refinements, including its integration with economic geography models. This extensive
field in the economic literature, which places innovation and investment in R&D at the
heart of the growth process, is a particularly suitable framework for this discussion. It will
allow us to precisely identify the main sources of market failure, characterize their effects
(positive or negative) on incentives for firms to invest in R&D and identify suitable financial
instruments to correct them. In doing so, we will be able to provide a comprehensive, clear
and concise overview of the origins and impact of various types of market failures on R&D,
as well as solutions to these problems.
Five different sources of market failure are identified. One of these clearly leads pri-
vate agents to underinvest in R&D, whereas two others lead them to overinvest. The
two remaining sources, which are related to knowledge externalities and economic geog-
raphy, have ambiguous effects. Thus, our review of the literature on growth shows that
various types of market failures have opposing effects on private incentives to invest in
R&D; therefore, we are ultimately unable to reach a specific conclusion regarding the ex-
istence of widespread underinvestment in R&D by private firms. Facing this theoretical
inconclusiveness, we searched for clarification in the empirical literature that documents
and measures private sector underinvestment in R&D. After demonstrating the limitations
of this research, based on estimated extended innovation production functions, we looked
to studies that calibrate theoretical models. These not only take diverse theoretically iden-
tified types of market failures into account, but also estimate their relative importance,
which may have significant implications for public policy. Whereas the pioneering papers
of Jones and Williams (1998, 2000) conclude that firms significantly underinvest in R&D,
the more recent calibration exercises of Comin (2004), Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2005),
Reis and Sequeira (2007) and Strulik (2007) strongly qualify this conclusion. Overall, their
arguments tend to cast doubt on the idea of the massive, global insufficiency of private
investment in R&D. Private sector underinvestment in R&D is seen as occurring only in
specific contexts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the evolution
of the modeling of R&D and innovation, from the first generation of endogenous growth
models to models that integrate R&D into an economic geography framework, with a
specific focus on the types of market failures that are identified by these models and the
potential for public policies to address them. Section 2 provides more detailed descriptions
of the origins and impacts of the main types of market failures identified here, as well as
measures that could potentially correct them. Section 3 discusses whether private sector
underinvestment in R&D actually exists in light of econometric and calibration exercises that
seek to measure the gap between private and social returns to R&D. Our main proposals
regarding the use of financial instruments in public policies and avenues for future research
are developed in the conclusion.
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1 R&D, innovation and growth: Theoretical modeling and
the role of public policy
1.1 From a "productivity black-box" framework to a R&D productivity
enhancing framework
The renewal of growth theories at the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s sought
to address criticisms of neo-classical growth models à la Solow (1956), which are the
assumptions of an exogenous savings rate and exogenous technological progress. These
assumptions, combined with a cumulative factor exhibiting diminishing returns to scale,
imply that the long-run growth rate of the economy is equal to the exogenous rate of tech-
nological progress. Consequently, governments cannot influence the steady-state growth
rate of the economy through incentive measures. Some growth models, such as those
of Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991), partially respond to these criticisms by making the
savings rate endogenous and allowing for sustained growth (without technical progress),
assuming constant returns to the cumulative factor. Although such models are interesting
because they highlight (1) the conditions necessary to obtain a positive growth rate in the
long run without technical progress (the accumulated factor should exhibit constant returns
to scale), (2) the existence of external capital effects that can explain sustained growth
and (3) the need for government interventions when capital externalities exist, major dis-
satisfaction remains. Indeed, the models of Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991) postulate
the exogeneity of technical progress, i.e., they do not explain the origins of Total Factor
Productivity (TFP). In other words, such endogenous growth models are only useful for
exploring the determinants of growth that are not related to innovation.
This theoretical limitation was a major concern for economists because most empirical
studies indicate a significant contribution of TFP to economic growth (and it is perhaps the
most important contribution). The previously cited models are not able to endogenously
explain TFP because they are constructed using a perfectly competitive market framework.
According to Romer (1990), the ideas and knowledge that are at the root of innovation share
the characteristics of public goods (meaning that they are non-rival and non-excludable),
which suggests that technical progress cannot occur in a context of perfect competition.
The models of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) or Aghion and Howitt (1992),
which macroeconomists refer to as the first generation of R&D-based endogenous growth
models, respond to this problem by introducing an imperfect competitive framework. In
these models, the existence of an imperfect competitive market is related to the presence of
an intellectual property system that provides infinite-life patents to inventors. This patent
system creates an incentive for inventors to perform R&D activities with the objective of
launching new products and processes to benefit from (relative) monopoly power. In this
way, and in contrast to the models of Solow, Lucas and Rebelo, these models explain the
origins and evolution of TFP as the result of (individual) rational decisions.
In the next subsection, we will describe how the R&D-based growth literature (since
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the 90s) has modeled the origins and evolution of the TFP and try to highlight (1) the
core debates that have emerged and (2) their public policy implications. This literature is
summarized in Table 1 at the end of the paper.
1.2 From the first-generation of R&D-based growth model to the second
and beyond: Literature in support of public R&D policies
1.2.1 The first generation of R&D-based growth models
The first generation of R&D-based growth models proliferated in the 90s following the
pioneering works of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992). This literature explains the evolution of technical progress by the research efforts
conducted by entrepreneurs. The nature of innovation is the main element of differentiation
in this literature. Two main classes of innovation are modeled: the introduction of new
(varieties of) products and/or quality improvements to existing products. This distinction
is fundamental for the R&D-based growth literature due to strong differences in terms of
(1) modeling, (2) implications and (3) scientific development. In what follows, we briefly
present the general properties of these two strands of the growth literature.
Growth models based on the creation of new products
In these models (see Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, chap.3)), the
level of the economy’s technical progress is determined by the number of (differentiated)
intermediate available products that are used in the production of a final consumption
good. Thus, the evolution of TFP is determined by the arrival rate of new products.
Increased productivity in such models can be interpreted as follows: every intermediate
product achieves one particular goal of the production process such that the creation of
new intermediate products leads to an increase in the specialization and rationalization of
the production process. We can summarize the core elements of such models with the
following equation:
Yt =
[∫ At
0
xσitdi
]
(1)
where Yt represents the final consumption good, At is the number of varieties, xit is the
quantity of intermediate products i used in production and σ ∈]0; 1[ represents the degree
of substitution between each intermediate product. In such models, the creation of new
intermediate products is carried out in two steps: first, entrepreneurs have to undertake
R&D efforts to create blueprints of the new products before being able to put them into
production (and enter into monopolistic competition). Note that in such models, incentives
to perform R&D are primarily attributable to the existence of an IP system that provides
infinite-life patents to inventors, which ensure that they will be "local" monopolists in
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the production of their products. The arrival rate of blueprints (hereafter referred to as
"knowledge") is assumed to be a deterministic function of R&D efforts and past knowledge
level:
A˙t = δAtaLt (2)
where At represents the existing knowledge stock and is equal to the number of varieties,
0 < a < 1 represents the proportion of workers engaged in R&D activities, Lt is the
quantity of labor and δ is an exogenous R&D productivity parameter. This knowledge
production function reflects the notion of Romer (1990) that the quasi-public-good char-
acteristics of knowledge imply that all entrepreneurs have access to the global knowledge
stock. Consequently, the existing knowledge stock generates positive external effects for
all potential innovators.
The steady state of such models is characterized by a constant TFP (hereafter referred
to as "growth") rate denoted by g = A˙t/At. As seen in (??), the growth rate increases with
the number of researchers (Lt) such that according to such models, the higher the number
of researchers in an economy, the higher the growth rate is. In contrast to the models of
Solow, Lucas and Rebelo, this implies that the implementation of public support for R&D
would be able to influence an economy’s long-run dynamics. Although an expansion in the
variety of products used in production captures certain aspects of the innovation process,
most innovations we observe in practice either increase the quality of an existing product
or reduce production costs. Therefore, numerous innovations have a number of distinct
features compared to "horizontal" differentiation.
Growth models based on the quality improvement of existing products
In these models (see Grossman and Helpman (1991, chap.4) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992)), the level of the economy’s technical progress is determined by the quality level
of the intermediate products that are used in the production of a final consumption good.
Thus, the evolution of TFP is determined by the arrival rate of higher quality intermediate
products. Increased productivity in such models is related to the quality of an intermediate
product, which determines its level of productivity in the final good production sector. We
can summarize the core elements of such models with the following equation:
Yt =
m∑
i=1
A1−σit x
σ
it (3)
where Yt represents the final consumption good, xit is the quantity of intermediate prod-
ucts i used in the production and Ait is a productivity variable that measures the quality of
each input i. Thus in such models, the productivity growth of the economy is the sum of
the productivity growth in each i intermediate product sector. Each intermediate product
i is produced and sold exclusively by the most recent innovator. A successful innovator
in sector i improves the quality parameter Ait by a factor γ > 1 and is thus able to dis-
place the previous innovator as the incumbent intermediate monopolist in that sector, until
being displaced by the next innovator. If technological progress is driven by R&D efforts
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of entrepreneurs and the knowledge stock available in the economy, as in the previously
presented product variety model, the arrival rate of a new quality product in sector i is
sometimes assumed to be random:
Ai,t+1 =
{
γAi,t with a probability δaLt
Ai,t with a probability 1− δaLt (4)
where aLt represents the number of researchers working in R&D when the quality Ait
of product i is the "leading-edge" technology, i.e., the required investment in R&D to
generate the next quality level. Note that these models implicitly include intertemporal
knowledge externalities in the sense that the inventor of the Ai,t+1 quality level freely uses
the knowledge embodied in past quality levels A0, A1, ..., At. The steady state of such
models is characterized by a constant growth rate, denoted by g = A˙t/At, and supported
by the continuing appearance of innovations, which increase the productivity of the final
sector. According to the innovation production function (4), the long-run growth rate has
the same relation with the R&D input as in the expanding variety models. Consequently,
public policies raising private incentives to invest in R&D are able to increase the long-run
growth rate.
Thus, the main contribution of the quality ladder models (compared to the variety
models) is the introduction of a creative destruction process of innovation. Indeed, such
a process is absent in the expanding variety models, in which a newly invented product is
used alongside all previous product varieties; in practice, newly invented, superior products
often replace existing varieties. Thus, in some sense, expanding product variety models
do not provide a good description of innovation dynamics in practice because they do not
capture the competitive aspects of innovation. These competitive aspects are related to
the Schumpeterian creative destruction process in which economic growth is driven, at
least in part, by the replacement of incumbents by new firms. Nevertheless, although the
nature of innovations differs from (and, in certain sense, is complementary to) expanding
variety models, their fundamental conclusions are relatively similar2. Indeed, in both classes
of models, the long-run growth rate is primarily driven by rational private investment in
R&D, which allows public authorities to implement incentive systems that will influence
the economy’s dynamics.
1.2.2 The scale effect debate and the second generation of R&D-based growth
models
During the 90s, an intense debate concerning the first generation models emerged and has
been the "fuel" for the development of the second generation of models. This debate con-
cerns the existence of a strong scale effect in these models, which constitutes an important
limitation for many economists, such as Jones (1995a). Indeed, as previously mentioned,
in such models, the TFP dynamics is directly dependent on the amount of resources al-
located to R&D activities. This implies that the size of an economy’s population, given
8
preferences and technologies, is the main driver of its growth rate. In other words, this
scale effect means that if an economy grows by 100%, the resources allocated to R&D,
and subsequently its growth rate, should also increase by 100%. Obviously, this implication
is not verified in reality, as indicated by Jones (1995b, p.760): "The number of scientists
engaged in R&D in advanced countries has grown dramatically over the last 40 years and
growth rates either have exhibited a constant mean or have declined on average."
The pioneering work of Jones (1995b) attempts to avoid this scale effect while retaining
the core elements of first-generation models. This scale effect is caused by the fact that
the used innovation production function (see ((??) and (??)) exhibits constant returns to
R&D (measured by the ratio A˙t/aLt). The model of Jones (1995b) is very similar to that
of Romer, with the exception of the innovation production function:
A˙t = δ(aLt)λAt (5)
where  < 1 represents the degree of intertemporal knowledge externalities, λ ∈]0, 1]
refers to the existence of duplications in R&D activities and the other parameters have the
same meaning as previously. Because  < 1, this innovation production function exhibits
diminishing returns to R&D. For Jones (1995b), the degree of spillovers is determined by
two opposing effects. The first reflects the idea that knowledge accumulated in the past
increases the productivity of current R&D activities. The second refers to the concept of
"lower technological opportunities", which means that the greater the knowledge stock,
the greater the difficulty of creating new knowledge. Note that when  = 1 and λ = 1,
we obtain the innovation production function used in the first generation of variety growth
models (2). Thus, the innovation process modeled in Romer (1990) or Grossman and
Helpman (1991) is a particular case in which returns to R&D are constant, which is not
justified a priori according to Jones (1995b)3. The assumption of decreasing returns to
R&D retained in the model of Jones implies that the growth rate becomes independent of
investment in R&D in the long run. At first glance, this result has strong implications for
public interventions in the sense that public policies that increase incentives to invest in
R&D will only have a temporary effect on the growth rate. Indeed, because accumulated
capital (in this case knowledge) exhibits diminishing returns to scale, the dynamics of this
model has the same properties as the model of Solow, that is, the long-run growth rate
is primarily driven by the population growth rate. Consequently, as mentioned by Jones
(1995b), such a model cannot be classified as endogenous because long-run growth is not
dependent on the rational decisions of economic agents. Nevertheless, the evolution of TFP,
which generates the long-run growth rate, is the consequence of R&D activities realized by
rational agents. This is the reason why this type of model is usually considered to be "semi-
endogenous". Kortum (1997) and Segrestrom (1998) have adapted the semi-endogenous
growth process into a quality-improving innovation framework.
The semi-endogenous literature represents, however, only a particular strand of the
second generation of R&D-based growth models. In the late 90s, several authors, such as
Aghion and Howitt (1998, chap.12), Peretto (1998), Young (1998) and Dinopoulos and
Thompson (1998), developed new methods for eliminating the scale effect while maintaining
9
an endogenous growth pattern, which we refer to as Schumpeterian growth models. These
models add a second dimension to the first-generation R&D-based growth models. To
simplify, they assume that there are two types of R&D. The first type creates blueprints
for horizontally differentiated goods, and their quality is improved through the second type
of R&D. In other words, in these models, the level of technical progress is determined by
both the number and quality of the available intermediate goods used in the production of
a final consumption good. Thus, the evolution of TFP is determined by the arrival rates of
new products but also by improvements in the quality of these intermediate goods. Even if
this class of models presents technical complications, we can summarize its core elements
with the following equation:
Yt =
[∫ At
0
xσitdi
]1/σ
(6)
where Yt represents the final consumption good, xit is the quantity of intermediate products
i used in production and At is the number of varieties of the intermediate product. As
before, σ ∈]0; 1[ represents the degree of substitution between each intermediate product.
The arrival rate of new varieties is assumed to only be a deterministic function of the R&D
efforts4:
A˙t = aLt (7)
where a represents the proportion of workers engaged in the R&D activities to develop new
varieties. Remember that there is a second type of R&D that improves on the quality of
the intermediate output used in the final good sector. There are (1−a)Lt workers available
to improve quality and produce xit goods. Assuming that a fraction (1 − b) of them are
employed in the production of xit, then we can express the production function of xit as:
xit = Bit
(1− b)(1− a)Lt
At
(8)
where Bit is the level of quality of the xit goods. The remaining fraction of workers is
employed in the second type of R&D and we assume that the quality of good i, denoted
Bit, evolves according to:
B˙it = δ
b(1− a)Lt
At
Bit (9)
Note that in contrast to the first type of R&D, the second type of R&D (quality en-
hancement) allows for intertemporal knowledge externalities in the sense that past quality
increases the productivity of this type R&D. It is straightforward that the long-run growth
rate of the economy is a linear function of the evolution of the number and quality of
varieties. According to (7), the long-run growth of new varieties is pinned down by popu-
lation growth (as in semi-endogenous growth). According to (8), the evolution of quality
is a function of population growth but is not pinned down by it because the dynamics of
quality is affected by the proportion of workers used in both types of R&D, which is en-
dogenously determined. It should also be noted that this model eliminates the scale effect
because the growth rate does not depend on population size but rather on the intensity of
labor employed in both R&D sectors. Consequently, and in contrast to semi-endogenous
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models, this type of model offers new opportunities for public interventions. Indeed, public
policies that increase private incentives to invest in R&D are able to increase the long-run
growth rate by changing the allocation of workers between R&D and production. The
reason that the scale effect disappears is that when the population increases, the number
of available varieties increases proportionally, leaving the amount of research per variety,
and therefore growth, unchanged. Because the Total Factor Productivity in those models
has two dimensions, such models appear to be more realistic and empirical data seem to
confirm this idea. Indeed, the empirical studies of Madsen (2008) and Saunoris and Payne
(2011) suggest that the evolution of TFP is clearly better explained by research intensity
(Schumpeterian models) than by the rate of population growth (semi-endogenous models).
Nevertheless, according to Jones (1999), this result relies again on a special case in which
labor productivity in the research sector is constant over time. In fact, in equations (7)
and (9), these models implicitly assume that Lλt , where λ = 1. Jones (1999) shows that
if we assume that λ 6= 1, then the model exhibits a scale effect (λ < 1) or asymptotically
returns to a semi-endogenous growth model (λ > 1).
1.2.3 Beyond the debate on scale effects
The previous section shows that the endogeneity of the growth rate in the literature is
strongly dependent on knife-edge assumptions that are subject to debate. Nevertheless,
some economists, such as Temple (2003), question the importance of the scale effects
issue. According to Temple (2003, p.498), "Instead of worrying about the effects of policy
on the growth rate in a hypothetical long-run equilibrium, perhaps far distant in time, we
should analyse the impact on welfare. It is entirely possible that models which yield very
different long-run outcomes are in much closer agreement on welfare implications." His
argument is based on the fact that the central question in growth theories is to understand
the relationship between parameter changes and the level of welfare, not the long-run
behavior of the growth rate. Indeed, although investment in R&D has no long-run effects
on growth in the semi-endogenous literature, it does, however, have a direct effect on
the level of per-capita income. Consequently, determining the channel through which a
public policy (affecting private incentives to invest in R&D) influences welfare is not really
crucial because it is not obvious that an effect on the growth rate is more effective than an
effect on the income level. Indeed, if a policy that increases the growth rate has the same
effect on welfare as a policy that increases per-capita income, then the debate between
endogenous and semi-endogenous growth does not appear to be very relevant. The more
important questions resulting from this observation are the extent to which the result of the
free market equilibrium outcome differs from the optimal outcome and the public policies
that are able to reach this optimum. Indeed, both the first and second generations of
R&D-based growth models show that public policies that affect private incentives to invest
in R&D can directly affect welfare (but not through the same channels).
In addition, although the scale effects debate was one of the main drivers of the R&D-
based growth literature in the 90s, other approaches emerged in the late 90s and during the
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2000s with objectives other than dealing with the issue of scale effects. Among these, we
can mention the important works of Aghion et al. (1997, 2001, 2005), which gave a new
momentum to Schumpeterian models by modifying the nature of technological progress.
In previous Schumpeterian models, a technological laggard could never develop and use the
current state-of-the-art technology; the only way for a laggard to advance is to leapfrog
over the industry leader by developing a superior technology. In contrast to this view, the
step-by-step approach developed by Aghion et al. (1997, 2001, 2005) assumes that laggards
cannot develop superior technologies directly but are instead forced to first catch up with
the leading-edge technology before battling for technological leadership in the future. This
vision of technological progress provides new theoretical results with regard to the relation
between product market competition (PMC) and growth. In earlier Schumpeterian models,
an increase in PMC always has a negative effect on growth because it reduces the flow of
monopolistic rents and hence reduces the incentives to innovate. In a step-by-step process,
the incentive to perform R&D does not depend on the rents of a successful innovator but
rather on the innovator’s incremental rents, that is, the difference between the post- and
pre-innovation rents of incumbent firms. As shown in Aghion and al. (2005), this no
longer implies a negative linear relationship between PMC and innovation but rather an
inverted-U-shaped relationship. The reason for this is that more competition may increase
the incremental profits from innovating and thereby encourage R&D investments with
the objective of "escaping innovation". Aghion et al. (2005) show that the positive
relation between PMC and innovation particularly exists in sectors where incumbent firms
are engaged in "neck-and-neck" competition, whereas a negative relationship is more likely
to appear in sectors where incumbent firms are far from the technological frontier.
Thus, the step-by-step innovation framework provides a more realistic modeling of pri-
vate incentives to invest in R&D. This highlights the possibility of a non-linear relationship
between core economic variables, implying a non-linear gap between market and social
outcomes. More specifically, these works show that (1) more competition can have both
positive and negative effects on incentives to invest in R&D and (2) appropriate R&D
support is strongly influenced by the existing link between competition and innovation,
which is industry-specific and primarily depends on the technological gap between leaders
and followers in a particular industry. Nevertheless, although this new development in the
R&D-based growth theory is very interesting and its implications for public interventions
could be discussed further, we choose to focus on another development in this literature for
two reasons. The first is related to the complexity of the step-by-step approach, which does
not allow for the analysis of welfare in relation to R&D policies. The second is that there
is a more tractable and less known literature that integrates a very promising and impor-
tant dimension of the R&D-based growth literature, namely, the role of location. Indeed,
in the late 90s, new models emerged providing a synthetic framework between the New
Economic Geography models (Krugman, 1991) and the endogenous growth theory (Romer,
1990). The advantage of this literature is that it provides an analytical framework reporting
the stylized facts regarding the interactions between innovation, economic geography and
growth. This framework is especially interesting in discussing the effects of R&D policies
given the empirically observed, specific geography of innovative activities.
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1.3 The New Economic Geography and Growth models
The New Economic Geography (NEG) models provide a theoretical explanation for the
agglomeration of economic activities based on the existence of pecuniary externalities link-
ing the locations of firms with those of consumers. These pecuniary externalities5 result
from the combination of increasing returns and transport costs that influence the trade of
goods. The main contribution of this literature is that it demonstrates that such pecu-
niary externalities can produce self-sustaining agglomeration processes. Consequently, the
advantage of crossing NEG models with endogenous growth models is the integration (in
a dynamic framework) of two main stylized facts: (1) the location of economic activities
is characterized by agglomeration and (2) the capital accumulation is driven by the spatial
concentration of economic activities.
In terms of modeling, the New Economic Geography and Growth (NEGG) literature
always uses a variety of growth process (mostly endogenous, but could also be semi-
endogenous) but different location frameworks. In summary, we can group NEGG models
into two categories. The first includes cumulative causation mechanisms related to the
migration of labor or the vertical links between industries. The second assumes that capital
is mobile but its owners are not; therefore, this location framework, called Footlose Capital
(FC), excludes cumulative causation mechanisms related to demand in the Core-Periphery
model (CP) à la Krugman (1991), or costs in the vertical linkages model (VL) à la Krug-
man and Venables (1995). Consequently, the first category of NEGG models (with a CP or
VL location framework) will mainly focus on analyzing the stability of symmetric and core-
periphery configurations, whereas stability issues are not present in the second category of
NEGG models (with FC location framework) because each location equilibrium is stable by
definition. This simpler location framework is particularly useful for analyzing the effects
of public policies in an NEGG framework. The table below summarizes the contributions
to the NEGG literature:
Core Periphery and Footloose Capital
Vertical linkage
Englmann and Walz (1995) Martin and Ottaviano(1999)
Walz (1996) Martin (1999)
Walz (1999) Baldwin and Forslid (2000a)
Baldwin and Forslid (2000b) Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (2001)
Martin and Ottaviano (2001) Riou (2003)
Fujita and Thisse (2002) Baldwin and Martin (2004)
Fujita and Thisse (2003) Minniti and Parello (2011)
Montmartin (2013)
In what follows, we briefly present an extension of Martin and Ottaviano’s (1999) NEGG
model, which uses a Footlose Capital location framework. In this framework, the technolog-
ical level of the economy is determined, as in Romer (1990), by the number of differentiated
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products available. There are two countries (i and j) that share the same technologies and
preferences but can have different initial endowments of knowledge, denoted by Ai(0) and
Aj(0), respectively. In contrast to Romer’s model, these goods are not used as intermediate
inputs to produce a final consumption good. Instead, they are consumption goods subject
to "Iceberg trade costs" between the two countries. We can summarize the core elements
of these models with the following equation:
Yt =
[∫ Ait
0
xσitdi+
∫ Ajt
0
xσjtdj
]1/σ
(10)
where Yt represents a world consumption index for differentiated products, Ai(j) represents
the number of varieties produced in countries i and j respectively, and xi(j) represents the
quantity of each variety produced. As in Romer, the intermediate firms have to engage
in R&D activities to create a variety blueprint before being able to produce that variety.
Consequently, in these models, the total number of varieties At = Ait + Ajt is again
strictly equivalent to the number of blueprints produced by R&D activities. The R&D
sector in the model is similar to that in Romer (1990)6 with the exception that in this case,
economic geography will matter. Because knowledge is perfectly mobile across countries,
the countries’ growth rates are equal to the world growth rate. The arrival rate of blueprints
is still assumed to be a deterministic function of R&D efforts and the past knowledge level
but is also influenced by the economic geography:
A˙t = δaLtWAt (11)
W ≡ max{sn + γ(1− sn); γsn + (1− sn)}
where At = Ait + Ajt represents the world stock of existing knowledge, a represents the
proportion of workers employed in R&D, Lt is the quantity of labor, δ is an exogenous
R&D productivity parameter and W is the space component of knowledge spillovers. sn ≡
Ait/At represents the share of intermediate firms operating in country i. According to
the empirical literature on knowledge spillovers (Audretsch and Feldman, 1991, 2004), the
parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] will account for the localized nature of knowledge spillovers. Indeed,
the existence of tacit knowledge, which is better transmitted by face-to-face contact, implies
that geographic proximity is relevant to the transmission of knowledge. If γ = 0, then
knowledge spillovers are purely localized, i.e., R&D activities located in country i will
only accede to the Ait stock of knowledge whereas those located in country j will only
accede to Ajt stock of knowledge. When γ = 1, knowledge spillovers are purely global;
in this case, geography does not matter and we obtain innovation production (2). When
γ ∈]0, 1[, knowledge spillovers are partially localized, that is, the R&D activities located
in one country can only partially benefit from knowledge produced abroad. Obviously,
because R&D activities are perfectly competitive, such activities will be entirely located in
the country that offers the highest level of knowledge externalities, that is, the country that
hosts the higher number of intermediate firms. Remember that the location of intermediate
firms will depend on the interplay between increasing returns (which provides incentives for
firms to locate themselves in the bigger market) and the transaction costs on goods (which
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provides incentives for firms to escape competition and locate themselves in the smaller
market), as in New Economic Geography models.
The steady state of such models is characterized by a constant TFP growth rate, denoted
by g = A˙t/At. Here, the growth rate is subject to the scale effect discussed below but this
can be avoided by employing an innovation production function, as in Jones (1995b). The
scale effect is not of importance here but rather the influence of the economic geography
on growth. As seen in (11), as long as there is an asymmetric location equilibrium for
intermediate firms, i.e., sn 6= 1/2, then the higher the concentration of firms in a country,
the higher the world growth rate is. This means that these models integrate two important
stylized facts: (1) the economic geography directly influences the dynamics of economies
and (2) there is a positive link between the concentration of economic activities and the
level of growth. Consequently, this framework highlights the fact that public policies that
increase incentives to innovate in R&D will not only influence welfare via scale or level effects
but also via an effect on the economic geography. This shows that policy makers must
define not only the total amount of support to R&D but also its geographical distribution
to account for spatial effects.
After having observed the evolution of the links among R&D, innovation and growth in
the R&D-based growth literature and their implications for public policy, the next section
identifies the main externalities and distortions related to R&D activities. Following Tem-
ple’s (2003) suggestion, we will focus on welfare issues related to R&D by studying the
origins of a potential gap between the free market and optimal equilibria and by identifying
the instruments that are potentially capable of filling this gap.
2 The R&D-related sources of market failures and public
instruments that can correct them
Although it is still the source for many discussions concerning the modeling of R&D and
innovation, the R&D-based growth literature that we have reviewed above raises the follow-
ing central questions: To what extent could the results of a decentralized economy diverge
from the social optimum? What would the origins of such divergence be and which are the
most suitable policies that can be implemented to fill this gap?
In this section, we detail the main sources of market failure that have been identified
by the growth literature. We notably emphasize the new types of externalities identified
by the introduction of the New Economic Geography framework into endogenous growth
models. For each type of market failure, we also indicate the public policy instruments that
are capable of correcting them. A summary of this second section can be found in Table 2
at the end of the paper.
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2.1 Intertemporal knowledge externalities: The "standing on shoulders"
and "fishing in the same lake" effects
The existence of knowledge externalities is explained by the very nature of the knowledge
generated by R&D. Indeed, knowledge displays some well-known characteristics of public
goods (non-rivalry and only partial excludability) that contribute to its free diffusion to
firms that have not participated in its production. Within endogenous growth models, such
externalities are intertemporal, i.e., externalities produced by a firm during period t will
increase the global knowledge stock available at t + 1. The theoretical literature distin-
guishes between two main possible effects of this increase in the knowledge stock. The
first refers to the "standing on shoulders of giants" phenomenon, which is derived from the
quotation by Isaac Newton and implies that the knowledge production process is cumula-
tive: the more important the available stock of knowledge is, the easier it is for researchers
to invent and produce new knowledge. The second effect, the "fishing in the same lake"
phenomenon, has the opposite consequence. It states that the most obvious inventions are
generated first; therefore, an increase in produced knowledge reduces future technological
opportunities. According to the second effect, knowledge externalities contribute to reduc-
ing future R&D productivity. The economic literature generally postulates that the first
effect dominates the second so that knowledge externalities are generally positive, i.e., they
have a positive impact on future R&D productivity (which corresponds to a positive value
for  in (??)).
The presence of knowledge externalities will create a gap between the level of investment
in R&D chosen by firms and the socially optimal level. Indeed, when firms make their R&D
investment decisions, they do not take into account the impact of current R&D on future
R&D productivity (which will reduce or increase innovation costs for future innovators,
depending on the sign of externalities). Hence, in case of positive (negative) knowledge
externalities, a decentralized economy leads to underinvestment (overinvestment) in R&D
compared to the optimal level because the level of private investment results from indi-
vidual decisions that do not consider this external effect. Various instruments can correct
the market failures generated by knowledge externalities. When they are positive, policy
instruments should increase the profitability of private R&D so that firms become more
inclined to invest in these activities. The implementation of subsidies that are proportional
either to the cost of R&D or to the supply price of new knowledge is often proposed to
correct such market failures (Grossman and Helpman 1991, Steger 2005). Likewise, when
knowledge externalities are negative, it is necessary to levy taxes that are proportional to
the cost of R&D or to supply price of new knowledge to reduce R&D profitability and limit
incentives to invest in R&D.
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2.2 The surplus appropriability problems: Consumer surplus appropri-
ability and the deadweight loss effects of market power
The surplus appropriability problem results from the fact that it is impossible for firms to
appropriate the entire potential increases in welfare generated by the commercialization of
their innovations. Although the patent system creates an incentive to innovate by conferring
monopolistic rents to inventors, it does not allow inventors to capture all the increases in
welfare generated by their innovations. This is due to the type of authorized monopoly,
which is not discriminant. Consequently, the classical monopolistic behavior of innovative
firms creates distortions in prices and produced quantities compared to optimal levels and
leads firms to underinvest in R&D. To illustrate our point, we graphically represent the
static inefficiency linked to the imperfect appropriation of welfare (Figure 1) and illustrate
the consequences in terms of dynamic inefficiency. The graph on Figure 1 represents the
social welfare generated by the supply of a new differentiated good (an innovation). Let
D(P ) be the demand function for the new good, PMC be the price defined by the monopoly
firm and PPC be the marginal cost of production of the good (i.e., the market price in a
competitive market). QMC is the production of the monopoly firm while QPC represents
the production of the firm in pure and perfect competition.
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Figure 1: The surplus appropriability problems
At the decentralized equilibrium, the static welfare generated by the commercialization
of a new differentiated good is represented by areas A and B. Area A measures the
consumer surplus, i.e., the increase in welfare obtained by consumers whose reserve prices
are higher than the selling price of the good. Area B represents the firm profits, i.e., the
difference between its total revenues and production costs. As we can see on the graph,
the firm’s monopolistic behavior induces a static inefficiency, measured by area C. By
fixing the selling price above the marginal cost, the monopolistic firm restricts demand and
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consequently production compared to a situation in which the goods would be sold at their
marginal cost (this is the famous deadweight loss effect).
In terms of dynamic inefficiency, the incentives to carry on R&D activities depend on
the profitability of innovation, which is measured by the flow of profits obtained by firms
in the intermediate sector following the market launch of a new product variety. The profit
obtained at each period is represented by area B, whereas the potential increase in social
welfare due to the launch of the new product is represented by area ABC. Thus, dynamic
inefficiency does not only integrate static inefficiency (area C) but also takes into account
the deficit in consumer surplus appropriation due to monopolistic behavior (area A). This
deficit in the appropriation of the potential increase in welfare created by innovation is the
source of the difference between the private and social returns to R&D. Consequently, this
surplus appropriability problem constitutes a market failure that leads firms to underinvest
in R&D compared to the optimal level.
Various public policies are likely to correct this type of failure. Using a variant of the
model of Jones (1995b), Sorensen (2006) shows that the surplus appropriability failure
caused by static and dynamic inefficiencies can be corrected by either a single instrument
or by a mix of two instruments. The instrument capable of simultaneously correcting the
static and dynamic inefficiencies consists of proposing a subsidy that partly covers the
purchasing costs of differentiated goods. Such a subsidy would allow for increases in the
demand for differentiated goods and the profits of the innovative firms, thereby augmenting
the profitability of innovation and generating stronger incentives for firms to engage in R&D
activities. Hence, such a subsidy allows for the correction of static (by increasing demand for
differentiated goods) and dynamic (by increasing incentives to invest in R&D) inefficiencies.
Sorensen (2006) also shows that this type of market failure can be corrected by a mix of two
instruments. The first is a subsidy proportional to the production of differentiated goods
and the second is a subsidy proportional to the cost of R&D. Subsiding the production of
differentiated goods encourages firms in the intermediate sector to increase their production
and thereby allows for the correction of static inefficiency (leading to the production of too
few differentiated goods). However, such a subsidy does not contribute to increasing firm
profits compared to the monopolistic situation because, although it encourages firms to
produce more, it also causes them to reduce their prices to the marginal cost level. Hence,
the profit obtained by firms is identical to the decentralized equilibrium profit. Using this
instrument alone cannot incentivize firms to increase their investments in R&D; this is why
it is necessary to combine this subsidy with another policy instrument capable of correcting
dynamic inefficiency. A subsidy for R&D, which reduces R&D costs, can encourage more
firms to engage in such activities. As a consequence, the global R&D investment level would
be augmented and the dynamic inefficiency linked to the surplus appropriability problem
would be corrected.
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2.3 Duplication of R&D activities: The "stepping on toes" effect
Whereas the two types of market failure presented above lead firms to underinvest in R&D,
other failures can have the opposite effect. Within an industrial sector, firms may engage in
innovation races with the hope of being the first to file a patent for a new product or process.
R&D programs may be set up concomitantly, which creates an important risk of duplication.
From the perspective of social returns to R&D, such duplications constitute inefficiency.
Indeed, when they make their investment decisions, firms do not account for the fact that
part of their R&D activities will also be carried out by other firms. Thus, duplication
externalities lead firms to overinvest in R&D compared to the socially optimal level. The
existence of duplication is often used to support the hypothesis of decreasing returns to
R&D: Doubling the resources engaged in R&D activities will not double innovation. In
equation (5), λ ∈ [0, 1[ represents the degree of duplication externalities, i.e., the lower λ,
the higher the duplication of R&D activities is.
To correct this failure, the theoretical literature proposes the same types of instruments
as those used to correct the knowledge externalities failure. As shown by Steger (2005), a
tax (or negative subsidy) based on the costs of R&D or the production of new knowledge
can correct the duplication problem. Indeed, such taxes will reduce incentives to invest
in R&D. Hence, regardless of whether duplications are caused by intentional behavior due
to innovation races or accidental processes, taxes will increase the cost of R&D for firms
and thereby limit global R&D investment. In addition, it should be noted that the microe-
conomic literature often proposes R&D cooperation as a way to reduce or even eliminate
duplication problems (Dalhlia et al. 2004). It is also specified that the most integrative
forms of cooperation are generally the most efficient in eliminating duplication problems.
In particular, the creation of Research Joint Ventures (RJV), in which firms cooperate all
along the innovation production process (from R&D activities to production decisions),
would provide the required incentives to correct this failure.
2.4 The rent transfer problem: The "business stealing" effect
The transfer of rents from past to new innovators constitutes another failure that leads
firms to overinvest in R&D. The most radical case can be found in quality-based growth
models such as that of Aghion and Howitt (1992). Indeed, in this conception of growth
dynamics, innovation renders existing products and technologies obsolete such that each
new wave of innovation leads to the total transfer of rents from past to new innovators.
In variety-based models, the transfer of rent is less radical. The launch of a new product
variety by a firm reduces the demand for all the other firms producing differentiated goods
and consequently reduces their profits, but it does not completely annihilate them.
The market failure caused by this rent transfer results in the tendency for firms to over-
invest in R&D because they do not account for the negative effect of the commercialization
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of their innovation on the profitability of incumbent firms. Thus, at a decentralized equi-
librium, the incentive to invest in R&D is too high and the pace of innovation is too rapid.
The primary authors of the new growth theories (Grossman and Helpman 1991, Aghion and
Howitt 1992) clearly associate this rent transfer with the famous creative destruction phe-
nomenon described by Schumpeter. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991, chp.3,p.82-
83), we should note that the use of a CES production function within variety-based growth
models implies complete compensation between the marginal effect of an innovation on the
consumer surplus (Area A on Figure 1) and its effects on the reduction of incumbent firm
profitability. Such a rent transfer will thereby limit the tendency to underinvest in R&D
due to surplus appropriability problems. More precisely, this means that within variety-
based growth models, the dynamic inefficiency caused by surplus appropriability problems
is only linked to its static inefficiency (Area C), i.e., its monopolistic behavior. In contrast,
this compensation is not automatic within the framework of quality-based growth models
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991, chp.4, p.110-111). Indeed, because the rent transfer is
total (and therefore more important), there is no automatic compensation between the
welfare gains of consumers and the lost profits of incumbent firms.
As noted by Steger (2005), the instruments capable of correcting this failure are the
same as those used to correct duplication problems, namely the implementation of a tax
proportional to the cost of R&D or the selling price of knowledge. Such taxes will allow for
reductions in returns to innovation and consequently the investment in R&D. The economy
will grow at a lower rate and innovators will benefit from higher monopolistic rents over
time.
2.5 Location externalities: Both sides of proximity effects
New Economic Geography and Growth models, which synthesize economic geography mod-
els with variety-based growth models, offer an interesting framework to account for inter-
actions between the geography of economic activities and growth dynamics. Within these
models, a new potential market failure appears to be linked to the economic geography.
This market failure is the result of externalities generated by the chosen locations of firms
(and consequently the locations of knowledge), which influence incentives to engage in
R&D activities. Indeed, the assumption of (partially) localized knowledge spillovers implies
that the marginal cost of knowledge production decreases with the spatial concentration
of economic activities. Thus, in these models, the economic geography directly influences
incentives to engage in R&D by changing the costs of such activities. In models with a
NEG framework, the location choices of firms are only based on comparisons of the profits
that they can obtain in each potential location. Consequently, firms do not consider the
potential welfare effects of their choices. More precisely, in these models, the location
choices of firms generate two main externalities that influence the level of investment in
R&D in the economy.
20
The first externality generated by the location decisions of firms refers to the impact of
the economic geography on (1) the value of assets and (2) the CES price indices of differ-
entiated goods. Due to perfect competition in the R&D sector, the value of knowledge is
given by its marginal cost of production. As in those models, the higher the spatial concen-
tration, the lower the marginal production cost of knowledge is (due to higher spillovers),
the nominal income of the owner of knowledge therefore decreases with the level of spa-
tial concentration. Consequently, the economic geography that maximizes the nominal
wealth of the knowledge owner is a dispersed equilibrium. Similarly, the location choices
of firms also influence the proportion of transaction costs supported by each location. The
NEGG literature (Martin and Ottaviano 1999, Montmartin 2013) shows that the economic
geography that minimizes global transaction costs7 is again a dispersed economic geogra-
phy. Consequently, from the perspective of this externality (which includes two effects),
when the economic geography is not perfectly dispersed (which is always the case when
Ai(0) 6= Aj(0)), then the equilibrium location is not optimal because there is too much
concentration. As a higher concentration implies a lower marginal cost of R&D, it follows
that this externality leads agents to overinvest in R&D because they benefit from R&D
costs that are lower than the optimal level.
The second externality generated by the location decisions of firms refers to the impact
of the economic geography on the growth rate. As seen in (11), a higher concentration
of economic activities reduces the cost of R&D, thereby increasing incentives to invest in
R&D as well as aggregate growth. Thus, the aggregate growth rate is maximized when the
cost of R&D is the lowest, that is, when activities are entirely concentrated in one location.
From the perspective of this externality, when the economic geography is not completely
concentrated in one country, the equilibrium location is not optimal because there is too
much dispersion. As a higher dispersion of firms implies a higher R&D cost, it follows that
this externality leads agents to underinvest in R&D because they suffer from R&D costs
that are higher than the optimal level.
To summarize, the location choices of firms generate two main externalities that provide
private firms with opposing incentives to invest in R&D. Consequently, the market failure
generated by the location choices of firms seems to be ambiguous. Given the complexity
of such models, we cannot analytically determine the optimal economic geography and
know whether location externalities lead the market to over- or under-invest in R&D.
We can, however, distinguish between two scenarios. If the concentration of firms in the
market outcome is higher than the concentration in the optimal outcome, then externalities
related to location choices generate a market failure that leads to overinvestment in R&D. In
contrast, if the concentration of firms in the market outcome is lower than the concentration
in the optimal outcome, then externalities related to location choices generate a market
failure that leads to underinvestment in R&D.
The literature shows that the main instruments that are able to correct this market
failure are location subsidies or taxes. Indeed, such instruments influence the relative
profitability of each location for private firms. Consequently, firms will respond to these
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incentives, which modify the relative attractiveness of each potential location. Obviously,
the appropriate policy depends on the sign of the gap between the concentrations of firms
in the market and optimal outcomes. If this gap is positive (the market concentration
is higher than the optimal concentration) then the appropriate policy will be to tax the
core location, which hosts the majority of firms, or subsidize the peripheral location, which
hosts fewer firms. The opposite policy should be implemented if the gap between the
concentration of firms in the market and optimal outcomes is negative.
3 Too little or too much private R&D: How can we mea-
sure the gap between the social and private returns to R&D
In the previous section, we showed that different types of market failures may create a
gap between the amount of R&D investment resulting from the decentralized equilibrium
and its optimal level; some failures lead firms to underinvest in R&D whereas others lead
them to overinvest. Theoretically, models generally fail to determine the overall result in
terms of under- or over-investment. Answers have also been sought empirically. Indeed,
different methods have been implemented to employ data to measure the real gap between
the private and social returns to R&D and thereby infer any insufficiencies or excesses in
private investment in R&D. This section is dedicated to presenting these methodologies
and the obtained results to discuss the reality (and, if demonstrated, the magnitude) of the
gap between the social and private returns to R&D. A summary of the present section can
be found in Table 3 at the end of the paper.
3.1 The limitations of econometric estimates
Using a growth-accounting approach, the productivity literature proposes an econometrical
measure of the impact of R&D activities on growth. This approach essentially connects the
growth of total factor productivity (TFP) to R&D8. R&D investment is treated similarly to
other capital investments within a classical production function. According to the following
specification, the social return to R&D is defined by the partial derivative of production
with respect to the R&D stock:
4logAt = δ + r˜PL
Rt
Yt
+ ut (12)
where A represents the TFP, R measures the level of resources devoted to R&D and Y
is the GDP. Parameters δ and u represent the constant and the error term of the model,
respectively. In this specification, we regress the TFP growth on the R&D share of output
so that r˜PL measures the contribution of the R&D investment to the TFP growth, that is,
the rate of return to R&D.
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In this literature, private return to R&D are usually estimated empirically using the share
of total turnover devoted to R&D at the firm level, whereas the measurement of the social
return uses the intensity of R&D expenditures at the sectoral level to identify knowledge
externalities between firms. This measure of the social return to R&D expanded rapidly
and was greatly developed by Scherer (1982) and Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984), among
others. Beyond the sectoral social return to R&D (i.e., private return plus intrasectoral
knowledge externalities), the objective is to estimate the "imported" return (which refers
to the impact of R&D activities carried out in other sectors on the productivity of the
sector under consideration). The measurement of this "second component" of the social
return to R&D requires the inclusion of a new variable within the production function: a
measure of the R&D expenditures of other sectors. Weighting the role of each sector is
generally performed using technological flow matrices among industries based on patent
data or input-output exchanges.
According to this methodology, estimations generate two main results. On the one hand,
the social return to R&D appears to be much higher than the private return, which would
lead firms to significantly underinvest in R&D. On the other hand, knowledge externalities
play a prominent role in this gap (see Griliches (1992) and Jones and Williams (1998) for a
review). Therefore, Griliches concluded his survey of this literature (Griliches, 1992, p.43)
as follows: "[...] there has been a significant number of reasonably well done studies all
pointing in the same direction: R&D spillovers are present, their magnitude may be quite
large, and social rates of return remain significantly above private rates."
As also stated by Griliches (1992, p.44), however, the estimations provided in this field
may overestimate the impact of knowledge externalities due to important measurement
problems9. These are partly related to the fuzziness of the very notion of knowledge ex-
ternalities, whose definitions and perimeters vary from one author to another. According
to Griliches (1992, p.36), for instance, pecuniary externalities relative to the use of innova-
tive inputs coming from other industries should not be regarded as knowledge externalities
for firms, although they may generate important increases in productivity. Because they
result from the difficulty of correctly evaluating the real value of purchased innovative in-
puts and are mediated through prices10, they are not directly linked to the free use of
new knowledge produced by external R&D activities. Consequently, they should be clearly
distinguished from knowledge externalities. Such a distinction between knowledge exter-
nalities and other pecuniary externalities of innovation is, however, difficult to implement
empirically. Therefore, estimations made in the productivity literature are likely to recog-
nize pecuniary externalities of innovation as knowledge externalities, which may lead to an
upward bias in explaining the gap between the private and social returns to R&D through
knowledge externalities.
In addition, these measurement issues are also aggravated by the omission of numerous
possible distortions associated with R&D in empirical studies. Jones and Williams (1998,
p.1120) note, therefore, that, "In fact, theory provides some reason to question findings
of the empirical productivity literature. The results of this literature are nearly based on
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a neoclassical theory of growth [...] that ignores many of the distortions associated with
research that are formalized by new growth theory [...]. Because these considerations are
omitted in the empirical literature, we may in fact have very little information about the
true social rate of return to R&D."
The lack of modeling distortions such as those caused by appropriability problems, du-
plication or rent transfers within empirical studies, may have two types of consequences.
First, it leads to the inclusion of phenomena that cause different types of distortions un-
der the single umbrella term of "knowledge externalities", subsequently confounding the
implications relevant for public policies. Indeed, it should be noted that when comparing
the difference between the returns to R&D at the individual and macro-economic levels,
the econometric literature on productivity effectively measures the global effect not only of
knowledge externalities but also of rent externality problems. However, it does not make
it possible to distinguish between these different effects. Second, although the employed
econometric specifications have steadily improved to better reveal the diversity of the chan-
nels through which knowledge externalities are transmitted, they still largely neglect the
other sources of market failures formalized by endogenous growth models (particularly those
that lead firms to overinvest in R&D).
Recent reviews of the latest econometric studies that measure returns to R&D by Sena
(2004) and Hall et al. (2010) present detailed examinations of the empirical studies that
trace spillovers via connections between firms, industries, and countries. Also notable is the
important strand of empirical literature relying on the theoretical intersection between the
New Economic Geography and Economics of Innovation that proliferated during the 90s
and 2000s and whose ambition was to measure the geographical dimension of knowledge
externalities and estimate their impact on agglomeration forces and social return to R&D
(for a review, see Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Autant-Bernard et al. (2011, 2013)).
However, although Hall et al. (2010) and Eberhart et al. (2013) note the enormous progress
that has been made in econometric techniques to address the estimation problems revealed
by the first round of productivity estimates, they also show that much remains to be done to
robustly estimate the private and social returns to R&D and the difference between them11.
Moreover, the rather clear conclusion that still emerges from this empirical literature, that
private return to R&D is higher than to ordinary capital and that social return is even higher
than private return, remains exclusively based on R&D spillover issues and continues to
ignore other sources of differences between the private and social returns to R&D activities
revealed by the theoretical literature.
As a result, we find the conclusion of Jones and Williams (1998) that the econometric
literature on productivity fails to satisfactorily estimate the social return to R&D and
contributes to the overestimation of the specific role of knowledge externalities to remain
largely valid. However, considering the great variability in the obtained results, depending
on the sectors or countries considered and the various possible biases revealed by the
methodological reviews, it is unclear whether this leads to an upward or downward bias
in measuring the gap between private and social returns to R&D. Given these limitations,
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many authors call for the reinforcement of the conceptual framework on which the empirical
estimations are based. Hence, the approach proposed by Jones and Williams (1998) is worth
presenting. Using a semi-endogenous growth model such as that of Jones (1995b), which
allows for the diverse failures of a decentralized economy to be accounted for, points the
way towards more theoretically based measurement strategies.
3.2 The advantage of theory-based measurement methods: Taking the
diverse sources of market failures into account
Jones and Williams (1998) chose to theoretically define the social return to R&D as the total
gain in consumption at time t+1 resulting from the reallocation of one unit of consumption
towards R&D activities at period t, assuming that the knowledge stock remains unchanged
at t+ 2. When applied to a variety-based, semi-endogenous growth model, this definition
allows first, for the distinct formalization of the different possible forms of market failures;
second, for the analytical derivation of the relationship between the theory-based measure
of the social return to R&D and the existing econometric estimates of this return; and third,
the analytical provision of a measure of the gap between the actual and optimal levels of
investment in R&D.
The production possibilities of the economy are rather similar to that of Jones’ model
(1995). The most important difference concerns the innovation production function be-
cause Jones and Williams add another potential externality related to R&D activities:
(1 + ψ)A˙t = δ(aLt)λAt (13)
where all parameters and variables have the same significance as in (5). Remember that
λ and  refer to duplication and knowledge externalities, respectively. The new parameter
ψ > 0 was introduced by Jones and Williams to better take the creative destruction process
into account in variety-growth models. Indeed, even though growth models based on variety
already include a rent transfer process from former towards new inventors, this transfer is
less important and radical than in quality-based models. This parameter basically refers
to the concept of innovation clusters. Innovations generally do not occur in isolation,
which means that firms have to adopt all the interrelated innovations contained in a cluster
to benefit from innovation. In the model, the introduction of ψ implies that some new
intermediate goods represent only an upgrade in existing goods and are not real innovations.
Consequently, from the social point of view, only 1/(1 + ψ) new goods actually increase
welfare. In contrast, from the innovator’s point of view, all new goods provide monopolistic
rents (regardless of whether they are really new or not) so the introduction of ψ will generate
a new market failure that leads firms to overinvest in R&D.
Because the literature on productivity does not include all the market failures formalized
in their model, Jones and Williams cannot directly link the social returns to R&D, as
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estimated within this literature, to the parameters of their model. They show, however,
that it is possible to linearly approximate this relationship as follows:
r˜JW = r˜PL + (1− λ)gY (14)
where r˜JW represents the social return to R&D measured by the model of Jones and
Williams (1998), r˜PL is the social return to R&D provided by the productivity literature
and (1 − λ)gY represents all effects that empirical literature does not take into account.
Note that (1− λ)gY is strictly positive because λ ∈ [0, 1[ and gY > 0 at the equilibrium.
Such a theoretical interpretation of the econometric estimations of the social return to
R&D leads Jones and Williams to a rather surprising conclusion. While the model introduces
new sources of market failure that lead to overinvestment, the results still show that the
literature on productivity underestimates the social return to R&D (with a maximum bias
equal to the production growth rate when there is no duplication in the R&D sector). Thus,
the econometric estimations provided by the literature on productivity would correspond
to the lower bounds of the true social return to R&D. The explanation given for this is as
follows: econometric studies ignore two dynamic factors that determine the social return to
R&D, namely intertemporal knowledge externalities12 and the gains (or losses) in capital
caused by the time-dependency of the value of knowledge.
The framework constructed by Jones and Williams also allows them to define the func-
tional relationship between the global level of R&D investment and its social return and then
to derive an analytical measure of the gap between equilibrium (I) and optimal investment
(I∗):
I∗
I
=
r˜PL
r˜p − (1− λ)gY
(15)
where r˜PL is the social return to R&D provided by the productivity literature and r˜p is
the private return to R&D. To evaluate the magnitude of private underinvestment in R&D,
Jones and Williams (1998, p.1129), rely, on the one hand, on the existing econometric
estimation of the social return to R&D, which ranges from 30% on average to 100% when
including impact transiting from other industries, and, on the other hand, an estimation of
the private return to R&D that ranges from 7% to 14%, in accordance with the average
real stock market return. This conservative estimate indicates that optimal investment in
research is more than two to four times actual investment.
With this methodology, Jones and Williams are able to estimate the gap between private
and social returns to R&D that clearly takes the diverse market failures contained in R&D-
based growth models into account. However, although it accounts for the diversity of
R&D-based market failures and produces a clear answer regarding the degree of private
underinvestment in R&D, such a structural approach still relies on econometric estimations
of returns to R&D. Hence, it is not free of the measurement errors found in this literature.
As stated by Hall et al. (2010, p.1135), "there is no reason to expect estimates of the ex
post returns to be particularly stable over time or across sectors or countries". Consequently,
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if these estimates can still be useful for making comparisons among various sectors or
countries and can guide R&D-related policy-making, it is necessary "to keep in mind that
the measurement process is not a search for a scientific constant." (Hall et al., 2010,
p.1136). Moreover, the method proposes a global estimation and does not tell us anything
about the relative impact of each market failure when this has important policy implications.
Public policies must not only be justified, they must be adequately designed to provoke the
expected effects and the greatest degree of responsiveness on the part of firms.
3.3 Calibrating theoretical models to measure the relative impact of
different market failures
Returning to the theory to better distinguish among the different sources of market failures
appears to be necessary. According to Temple (2003), however, it would be illusory to try
to directly confront the predictions of theoretical endogenous growth models against data
from that perspective. Focusing on the search for a balanced growth path, these models
demand restrictive assumptions and "It is not clear that we should expect models with this
property to be the best approximation to the data [...]" Temple (2003, p.507). In contrast,
if, as suggested in section 2, we consider these models to be useful devices for the analysis
of welfare effects, one interesting approach would be to calibrate theoretical models. "[...]
it will be virtually impossible to test the long-run predictions of growth models against the
data. [...] Given this difficulty, one approach would be to calibrate a variety of models,
under a range of assumptions. In the unlikely event that knife-edge restrictions are met in
the real world, and hence long-run growth is endogenous, a suitably parameterized semi-
endogenous model could still provide a reasonably good approximation to actual welfare
effects." (Temple, 2003, p.503).
The sensitivity analysis method developed by Stokey (1995) is still a reference for cal-
ibration exercises on theoretical growth models. The general idea of Stockey’s method
is to calibrate the most known parameters of the model with data from previous studies
and historical data (such as the GDP growth rate) and then analyze the sensitivity of the
results depending on a large range of values for the most unknown parameters which often
correspond to the key parameters of interest in the models (level of duplications, knowledge
externalities, markups, etc.). Thus, this method addresses the problem of great uncertainty
about the true magnitude of the various external effects present in such models. In this
pioneering work, Stockey (1995) investigates the gap between market and optimal R&D
investment by calibrating (for the US) a generalized13 first-generation variety growth model
such as that of Grossman and Helpman (1991, chap.4). Thus, Stockey’s model includes
the first four market failures presented in section 2. Even if the author does not provide a
specific measurement for the impact of each market failure, this paper provides some inter-
esting results for our purposes. Stockey (1995) shows that when the innovation technology
is linear with the R&D stock, it is unlikely that the equilibrium level of R&D will exceed
the optimal level. This result means that the "business-stealing" effect described in section
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2 seems unlikely to lead to excessive innovation by itself. On the contrary, it seems that
a curvature in the R&D technology (which corresponds to the values of  and λ in (13))
has the most systematic and strongest influencing on whether the equilibrium displays too
much or too little R&D relative to the optimal level. The level of substitutability between
goods and hence the market power of firms can also strongly influence the gap. More
generally, the results provided by Stockey (1995) tend to show (1) a greater number of
cases in which the market exhibits too little R&D rather than too much and (2) a higher
potential magnitude for underinvestment compared to that for overinvestment.
Following Stokey’s (1995) seminal work, Jones and Williams (2000) investigate the
same question while focusing on measuring the impact of each specific market failure.
The model developed in this paper is very similar to that of Jones (1995), i.e., a one-
sector semi-endogenous growth model exhibiting decreasing returns to R&D. The model
again incorporates the first four market failures presented in section 2 and is calibrated
according to micro- and macro-econometric data. With realistic parameter values, the
R&D investment of firms resulting from the decentralized equilibrium is 50% to 200%
lower than the socially desirable level when duplication is limited (less than 75%). Indeed,
when duplicated R&D activities and interest rates are too high, the simulations show
that a decentralized economy can exhibit overinvestment. To measure the contribution of
each market failure, the authors simulate the level of R&D investment when alternatively
internalizing each source of market failure (assuming that the three others are still effective).
When considering that the share of duplicated R&D activities ranges from 0% to 75%, the
simulations generate 4 main results:
• the internalization of knowledge externalities would increase the R&D investments of
firms by 16 to 36%;
• the internalization of the surplus appropriability problems would increase the R&D in-
vestments of firms by 140% (regardless of the degree of duplication);
• the internalization of failures due to the creative destruction process (rent transfer and
innovation clusters) would lead to a 24% reduction in the R&D investments of firms (re-
gardless of the degree of duplication);
• the internalization of duplication failures would have a "one-for-one" impact, i.e., when
25% of R&D activities are duplicated, the internalization of the corresponding failure would
reduce the R&D investment of firms by the same proportion.
These simulations show that the impact of the surplus appropriability failure is generally
prominent. More precisely, they clearly designate this failure as the main explanation for
the pronounced underinvestment of firms in R&D. Indeed, once it is internalized, the model
cannot conclude that there are situations of underinvestment and becomes highly sensitive
to the chosen parameter values. This result seems to significantly contradict those usu-
ally presented by the literature on productivity, which places knowledge externalities at the
heart of the explanation of the gap between the private and social returns to R&D. This
difference, however, is more a matter of language than fact. As underlined by Griliches
(1992, p.36), the literature on productivity recognizes pecuniary externalities of innovation
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as knowledge externalities. Now, as explained above, these externalities cannot be theo-
retically assimilated with knowledge externalities. They result from the imperfect market
valuations of innovative inputs and not from the free unintentional diffusion of the knowl-
edge necessary to produce them. Similarly, the proximity between the notion of pecuniary
externalities and the surplus appropriability problems described in section 2.2 can easily be
noted. Indeed, whereas the latter refer to informational and pricing constraints, which pre-
vent innovative firms from capturing the entire increases in welfare generated by the market
launch of their innovations, the former, describing the imperfect market valuation of inno-
vative products and services, clearly reveals that part of the surplus generated by innovation
benefits users and not innovators. Consequently, by at least partially integrating pecuniary
externalities of innovation within the measure of knowledge externalities, the productivity
literature undeniably confounds the impact of the two different sources of market failure,
knowledge externalities and surplus appropriability, under the same measure. Therefore,
when the econometric studies on productivity state that knowledge externalities are the
main explanation for the difference between the private and social returns to R&D, this is
much more indicative of an incorrect interpretation than a real contrast with the results
of Jones and Williams (2000). This capacity of the employed methodology to distinguish
between the two types of failure is what authorizes Jones and Williams to attribute the
main part of the gap between private and social returns to R&D to surplus appropriability
problems.
Concerning the importance of location externalities, the theoretical literature does not
provide much insight. Indeed, the complexity of this class of models does not allow for
the analytical determination of (1) the optimal location and, hence, (2) the social planner
solution. Nevertheless, the welfare analysis carried out by Montmartin (2013), in which a
NEGG model was calibrated, raises some interesting elements. Due to linear R&D tech-
nology, the simulations show that in most of cases, an increase in the market level of R&D
investment increases welfare, indicating the existence of underinvestment in R&D. Never-
theless, the key result of the paper is to show that when knowledge externalities are strongly
geographically localized (i.e., when the economic geography is more important for growth),
an R&D subsidy policy generates opposite effects on the welfare of each location. This
suggests that location externalities may have a strong influence on the deviation between
the market and optimal economic geography.
Overall, although the different strands of the literature emphasize the existence and
magnitude of a positive gap between the social and private returns to R&D, they do not
attribute the causes of this to the same factors (knowledge externalities for some and surplus
appropriability for others). This difference is especially important for public action because
these two types of market failure require different instruments to be corrected (see section
2.2 and 2.3). Hence, the capacity to better account for the inherent characteristics of R&D
activities explains the attractiveness of the theory-based simulation method developed by
Stockey (1995) for subsequent contributions to research in this field.
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3.4 Toward the idea of a smaller gap between market and optimal R&D:
Recent contributions and refinements
In general, the main results provided by the economic literature until the early 2000s are
conclusive on the existence of a significant gap between actual investment in R&D and
what would be the optimal amount14. More recent contributions to this debate based on
calibration methods, however, bring forth new elements that tend to call this central result
into question.
Comin (2004) proposes a new method for measuring the contribution of R&D investment
to TFP growth. Based on the free entry in R&D condition commonly used in growth models,
this method offers the main advantage of not imposing a specific form on the dynamics
of knowledge creation. The author uses data on R&D expenditure in the US to calibrate
the parameters of his model15 and obtains results that are markedly different from those
proposed both by Jones and Williams (2000) and econometrical studies on productivity.
Indeed, the contribution of R&D to productivity growth appears to be rather weak because
it would only explain approximately 10% of average annual TFP growth16. For the author,
two factors could explain this weak contribution. The first concerns the low observed
intensity of R&D expenditures (approximately 2% of US GDP) in the long run, which
would imply weak intertemporal knowledge externalities. The reasoning behind this is that
if knowledge externalities were strong, a weak intensity of R&D expenditures at time t would
generate a high growth rate and substantially reduce the innovation costs of production
at time t + 1. Economic agents would be encouraged to increase their investments in
R&D at t + 1, which would be incoherent with the observed stability of the intensity of
R&D expenditures. The second factor is that the low intensity of R&D expenditures leads
to a limited knowledge growth rate, thereby reducing the potential impact of R&D on
productivity growth (compared to other sources of productivity growth, such as human
capital). It should also be noted that the chosen model for innovation embodied in new
intermediate goods limits the size of externalities and thereby bounds the R&D contribution
to productivity.
To propose a measure of the gap between the equilibrium and socially optimal levels
of investment in R&D, the author specifies an R&D production function to obtain an
analytical expression of the optimum. The calibration of this function according to US
data shows that the optimal and observed investment levels are very similar. This result
appears to be robust to significant variations in parameters. Therefore, according to Comin
(2004), firms sufficiently invest in R&D activities because the global amount of private
investment is close to the optimal level. As specified by the author, this result, which
markedly differs from the existing literature, is linked to the chosen modeling strategy. The
approaches developed by Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2005), Reis and Sequiera (2007) and
Strulik (2007) also raise elements which question the magnitude of the underinvestment in
private R&D as presented by Jones and Williams (2000).
Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2005) proceed from the recognition that, in variety-based
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growth models, firm market power, the share of differentiated goods within final produc-
tion and the return to specialization are rigidly and arbitrary linked. Their objective is to
investigate private underinvestment in R&D by developing a semi-endogenous growth model
that does not directly link these elements. They first show that relaxing these restrictive
relationships between parameters allows for more potential situations of overinvestment
than is suggested by the variety-based models, such as that of Jones and Williams (2000).
Then, applying the empirically estimated US values for markup, the share of capital within
GDP and return to R&D, they demonstrate that although the existence of private under-
investment in R&D is a realistic hypothesis for the US, its magnitude is far lower than that
suggested by previous studies.
Similarly, Reis and Sequieira (2007) develop a synthesis model à la Arnold (1988) that
incorporates both an endogenous growth process à la Romer (1990), and a human capital
accumulation process, à la Lucas (1988). In addition to relaxing the relationship between
market power and return to specialization, they include negative externalities for human
capital accumulation. In doing so, the authors intend to account for the "erosion effect"
described by Galor and Moav (2002, p. 1148): "the time required for learning the new
technology diminishes with the level of education and increases with the rate of technolog-
ical change". This was also empirically confirmed by Kumar (2003) and Tamura (2006).
According to this model, a decentralized economy is marked by three failures. The first
two, which relate to knowledge externalities and firm market power (the surplus appro-
priability problems), lead private agents to underinvest in R&D, whereas the introduction
of the "erosion effect" creates a new failure that encourages firms to overinvest in R&D.
Indeed, at the individual level, researchers do not account for the negative impact of their
activities on human capital accumulation, which can be seen as an effect of creative de-
struction. Because the emergence of a gap between equilibrium and optimal investment
in R&D depends on the relative strength of these three effects, the authors calibrate their
model using the results of empirical studies. This allows us to define a threshold value
for the "erosion" parameter, from which the economy overinvests in R&D compared to
the level that would be socially optimal. Comparing this value to that provided by the
estimations of Kumar (2003) shows that situations of overinvestment are as plausible as
situations of underinvestment. When the returns to specialization are very high, however,
a decentralized economy clearly underinvests in R&D.
By developing an augmented two-R&D-sector model, à la Young (1998), with human
capital accumulation and imperfect altruism, Strulik (2007) proposes an even more radical
reassessment of the deviation of market R&D investment from the socially optimal level.
Indeed, the existence of two interdependent R&D sectors that generate different degrees
of externalities will moderate the influence of market failures on the equilibrium R&D
investment level due to substitution effects between R&D sectors. Assume, for instance,
an increase in the externalities generated by the variety R&D sector. In this case, a social
planner would allocate more resources to this R&D sector than the market would but could
simultaneously allocate fewer resources to the quality R&D sector, implying a potentially
small impact on the overall R&D investment. However, the presence of capital accumulation
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and imperfect altruism in the model also mitigates the influence of market failures on the
market level of R&D investment. Indeed, this allows for the appearance of channels through
which population growth negatively affects growth and reduces the role of R&D externalities
because growth in per-capita income is no longer driven solely by the TFP but also by growth
in labor quality. The numerical experiments conducted by Strulik (2007) with US data
show that the market share of employment in R&D is much closer to the socially optimal
level than suggested by earlier numerical studies (especially that of Jones and Williams,
2000). More precisely, the ratio between optimal and market R&D is estimated as being
between 0.91 and 1.03, suggesting very small potential deviations of the overall market
R&D investment level from its optimal level. In contrast, Strulik’s results highlight large
sectoral misallocations of factors between R&D sectors. As noted by Strulik (2007, p.384),
this shows that "the analysis has also shown that small deviation of the economy-wide R&D
effort from the social optimum is compatible with relatively large sectoral deviations. Hence,
the conclusion that laissez-faire provides approximately the optimal resource allocation does
not necessarily follow. Due to specific sectoral externalities, a social planner might allocate
researchers to sectors quite differently than the market, even though he chooses almost the
same overall employment in research".
The works we have presented in this section, while never excluding the possibility that
a decentralized economy could lead to underinvestment in R&D, strongly challenge the
previous consensus regarding the presence of an important gap between private and social
returns to R&D. Based on various refinements in the modeling of R&D within endogenous
growth, these new developments highlight new sources of market failures (particularly in
relation to human capital accumulation) and allow for a better understanding of this com-
plex problem related to the allocation of resources to R&D in a way that does not merely
answer the question of whether there is too much or too little R&D with "yes" or "no".
Perhaps the main message of this work for R&D public policies could be the following: It
increasingly appears that the main challenge that policy makers are now facing concerning
R&D policies is not to increase the global amount of incentives for R&D but rather to try
to efficiently allocate various instruments and funds across industries, regions and types of
research.
Conclusion
Many policy makers and economists who study R&D have long believed that market fail-
ures create a gap between the social and private returns to R&D, thereby limiting private
incentives to invest in R&D. Thus, government intervention would be necessary to correct
such failures and improve social welfare. Based on these arguments, many governments
have implemented policies aimed at stimulating private sector R&D investment since the
80s.
However, this common belief in the widespread and significant underinvestment in R&D
by firms compared to the socially optimal level of investment is increasingly being chal-
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lenged. In particular, political, theoretical and empirical considerations have emerged that
raise new questions regarding the rationale behind and efficacy of public policies designed
to stimulate private R&D investment. The main questions are whether the market failures
that cause insufficient private R&D investment really exist and whether massive, global
public policy support for private investment in R&D is always justified.
In this paper, we have sought to clarify the answers to these questions provided, on
the one hand, in the theoretical literature on endogenous growth theory and its integration
with economic geography, and, on the other hand, in the empirical literature seeking to
measure the social return to R&D in relation to its private return. In general, whereas the
existing literature often considers only one type of market failure or confounds different
types, creating imprecise analyses, we have clearly distinguished among different types
of market failures and described their differing effects (positive or negative) on the gap
between private and social returns to R&D. This has enabled us to clarify their differing
policy implications.
Two main conclusions with non-negligible policy implications arise from this analysis:
1. Contrary to widespread belief, recent developments in both the theoretical and
empirical literature on R&D-based endogenous growth do not support the existence of
systematic underinvestment in R&D by firms. Indeed, when we account for the separate
effects of different sources of market failures and estimate their relative importance, we
find that circumstances in which there is insufficient private investment in R&D are less
numerous and of less importance than previously thought (due to the non-negligible role
of certain types of market failures, such as duplication, creative destruction or location
externalities, which cause overinvestment in R&D).
In terms of public policy, these results lead to the following question: is massive global
public support for private investment in R&D justified? Indeed, it appears that public
financial support for private R&D should not be automatically and systematically imple-
mented. Careful analysis of the factors that influence private investment in R&D should be
undertaken to better target public interventions and implement them only when and where
the existence of an underinvestment problem is confirmed, i.e., when market failure is more
strongly associated with underinvestment than with overinvestment in R&D. In particular,
there is a need for a new policy mix that does not merely increase incentives to invest in
R&D but rather concentrates on searching for the most efficient allocation of funds across
industries, regions and types of research.
2. Even when situations of underinvestment are identified, new measures of the social
return to R&D, attained through the calibration of theoretical models, provide new evidence
regarding the relative importance of different types of market failures. In particular, contrary
to econometric analyses based on the estimation of innovation production functions, in
which knowledge externalities play a prominent role (even though their impact cannot be
clearly isolated), this new work finds the problem of surplus appropriability to be the main
explanation for firm under-investment in R&D.
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In terms of public policy, the appropriate balance of different financial instruments de-
signed to address underinvestment in R&D is the relevant issue. Indeed, current public
policies are mainly supply-oriented, employing such measures as subsidies or fiscal incen-
tives to stimulate private investment in R&D. However, the greater impact of the surplus
appropriability distortion relative to positive knowledge externalities would require a differ-
ent policy orientation, one that is more consumption- or demand-oriented, i.e., designed to
encourage the purchase of innovations.
Finally, this paper also reveals some of the main shortcomings in the macroeconomic
growth literature and suggests avenues for future research. In particular, we argue for the
development of theoretical and empirical models that integrate types of market failure that
have not yet been incorporated into the literature on growth, such as uncertainty and fi-
nancing problems. Improvements in models, which combine endogenous growth and new
economic geography, also seem necessary to improve our understanding of the effects of
interactions between geography, innovation and growth on incentives to undertake R&D
investments. In light of the recent development in R&D policies that incorporate a geo-
graphical dimension (for example, cluster policy), this is certainly an important topic for
future research.
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Notes
1Concerning R&D activities, the objectives of the Strategy Europe 2020 are those of the Lisbon Agenda
(2000). See http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm
2Nevertheless, we have to specify that in very specific cases, the conclusions of these two classes of
models concerning the need to support R&D can be significantly different. These differences are caused
by the modeling of the creative destruction process, the implications of which we will discuss in the next
section.
3see Jones (1995b, p.766) for a discussion of this assumption.
4In contrast to Romer (1990) or Grossman and Helpman (1991, chap.3), the creation of new varieties
does not depend on past knowledge, i.e., this type of R&D does not generate spillovers.
5These pecuniary externalities refer to all changes in supply and demand related to the economic
decisions of agents. In contrast to technological externalities, they are monetized by market results.
6Note that we can easily use a semi-endogenous process, as in Jones (1995b), without any complexity;
see Minitti and Parello (2011) for further details.
7In this case, we define global transaction costs as the sum of the price indices in both countries or
regions.
8See Carlaw and Lipsey (2003) for a review of the various interpretations and misinterpretations of
TFP as an instrument capable of driving public policies for growth. In particular, reviewing measurement
problems, they show that regardless of the method used to measure TFP, this indicator cannot correctly
identify the "supernormal profit" associated with technological change. They conclude, "that although
TFP is easily calculated it is difficult to interpret. Only under a very specific set of ideal conditions does it
measure the super normal benefits associated with technological change. It is, therefore, at best only an
indicator of how much measured output growth an economy achieves relative to measured input growth.
It is not very helpful to policy makers who wish to test the efficacy of their industrial policies." (ibid, p.
475). Within this paper, we do not provide any additional discussion about the concerns on measurement
and interpretation related to TFP; rather, we focus our attention on specific issues regarding how the
productivity literature has been used to measure the magnitude of the gap between the private and social
returns to R&D.
9For an in-depth discussion on these measurement issues, see Griliches (1979) and Griliches (1992).
10Note that this type of externality, which we call a pecuniary innovation externality, can also display
negative effects when innovative inputs are overvalued relative to the productivity gains they generate.
11See, in particular, the interesting paper of Eberhart et al. (2013) showing that the implementation of
a Griliches-type production function assuming cross-sectional independence and investigating knowledge
spillovers assuming a known, additively separable functional form for R&D and spillovers, is inadequate even
when the analysis focuses on private returns to R&D. Taking these cross-sectional interdependencies into
account would lower the estimated private return to R&D. The authors therefore conclude: "In our mind,
the search for a more appropriate specification of the knowledge production function that accounts for the
true nature of cross-sectional interdependencies and allows identification of private and social returns to
R&D should be regarded as the main challenge for the investigation of returns to R&D in years to come"
(Eberhart et al., 2013, p. 439 ). It can be noted that this statement echoes late developments in spatial
econometric techniques that are capable of better accounting for these interdependencies when estimating
knowledge production functions.
12Jones and Williams note that the relative stability of R&D expenditures over time still allows econo-
metric studies to capture, at least implicitly, these intertemporal externalities.
13In the sense that the developed model uses a rather general class of preferences that allows for a
variety of types of competition among intermediate firms and decreasing returns in the aggregate R&D
technology.
14For thorough reviews, see Cameron (1998), Carlaw and Lipsey (2003) or Hall et al. (2010).
15Which is largely inspired by the model of Jones and Williams, although it does not specify any functional
form for the knowledge production function.
16This result appears to be robust to great variations in the parameter values. When assuming an R&D
intensity of 6% of GDP, R&D expenditures still cannot explain more than half of productivity growth.
Moreover, the author extends his model by integrating problems of imitation and creative destruction and
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by using diverse production functions for non-innovative goods. The obtained results all confirm the weak
contribution of R&D expenditures to productivity growth.
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Tables
Table 1: R&D, Innovation and Growth: Modeling and Public Policies 
 
 
 
Second generation of quality-based models 
 
Quality model of step-by-step 
innovation 
 
Main contributors: Aghion and 
al. (1997), Aghion and al. (1998), 
Aghion and al. (2001) 
 
R&D technology: constant 
returns  
 
New implications:   
Effect of financial R&D policies 
on the growth rate and welfare 
depends on the technological 
distance between R&D 
competitors. 
Emphasize the potential role of 
“anti-trust” policies to increase 
growth and welfare 
Variety and quality based 
models 
Main contributors: Young 
(1998), Dinopoulos and 
Thompson (1998) 
 
R&D technology: two R&D 
sectors: one with decreasing 
returns and the other with 
constant returns 
 
New implications:   
The growth rate is dependent of 
the intensity of labor employed 
in the two R&D sectors.  
 
R&D policies have permanent 
effects on the growth rate and 
welfare  
New Economic Geography 
and Growth models 
Main contributors: 
Englmann & Walz (1995), 
Martin et Ottaviano (1999), 
Martin et Ottaviano (2001), 
Montmartin (2013) 
 
R&D technology: constant 
returns  
 
New implications:   
Growth depends both on 
economic geography and level 
of investment in R&D 
 
Effect of financial R&D 
policies on growth and 
welfare depends on their 
geographical design 
All R&D based growth models show that financial R&D policies can influence the growth rate (at 
least in the short run) and the welfare of an economy. Consequently, the need of such policies depends 
on the gap between the private and public returns to R&D. The origins (and the importance) of this 
gap is (mainly) due to the market failures generated by R&D activities attributes.  
R&D-based Growth literature 
Main contributors: Grossman et Helpman (1991, 
chp.4), Aghion et howitt (1992) 
 
Origin of growth: increasing the quality of products 
(increasing the productivity of inputs) 
 
Technology: Constant returns to R&D 
 
Implications:  
1) The growth rate is a linear function of the quantity 
of resources devoted to R&D 
2) Financial R&D policies can increase growth by 
increasing the amount devoted to R&D 
First generation of variety-based models 
 
First generation of quality-based models  
 
Semi-endogenous growth 
models 
 
Main contributors: Jones 
(1995), Kortum (1997), 
Segerstrom (1998) 
 
R&D technology: decreasing 
returns  
 
New implications:   
The level of investment in 
R&D affects growth only in the 
short-run by not in the long run 
 
Transitory effect of financial 
R&D policies on the growth 
rate but permanent effect on the 
income per capita (and welfare) 
 
Second generation of variety-based models 
 
Main contributors: Romer (1990), Grossman et Helpman 
(1991, chp.3) 
 
Origin of growth: increasing the number of varieties 
(increasing the level of specialization) 
 
Technology : Constant returns to R&D 
 
Implications:  
1) The growth rate is a linear function of the quantity of 
resources devoted to R&D 
2) Financial R&D policy can increase growth and welfare by 
increasing the amount devoted to R&D 
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